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Heated debates are currently taking place on whether to open the area of Lofoten and Vesterålen in
Northern Norway for petroleum production. Seismic explorations in this area have indicated promising
petroleum resources. The area is known for its unique landscape and as a key spawning and nursery area
for several economically important ﬁsh species. It hosts signiﬁcant bird colonies and the world's largest-
known deep-sea coral reef. New areas will be opened to petroleum production only if its high
environmental value can be maintained. A risk analysis approach has become central to this decision,
where the probability of a ‘worst-case scenario’ (a major oil spill) is assessed together with associated
environmental impacts. This paper examines and characterises uncertainties associated with these risk
assessments and some of the surrounding debates. Further, the paper reveals implications of these
uncertainties: (1) potential values embedded in the risk assessments, (2) lack of validity of quantiﬁed
worst-case scenarios and their probabilities and impacts, (3) limited prospects of ﬁlling addressed
knowledge gaps and (4) how risk assessments restrict the debate on what issues and uncertainties are
considered relevant. Taken together, this suggests that discussions on alternative approaches to decision
making should be more prominent in public and political debates.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The question of opening Norway's northern offshore areas for
petroleum production has been a long and heated political debate.
The values at stake are considerable. On one hand, petroleum
production promises to underpin Norway's economic wealth and
people's standard of living, both locally and nationally. On the
other hand, petroleum production, and in particular a major oil
spill in the area off the Lofoten and Vesterålen islands and Senja
(from now on referred to as the ‘Lofoten area’), is feared to have
the potential to signiﬁcantly disturb and alter vulnerable ecosystems
and thereby damage ﬁsheries and tourism in the area.
Large areas in Norwegian waters have been opened to petro-
leum exploitation since the ﬁrst oil ﬁeld was discovered in 1971.
Some areas still remain closed, as the northernmost area of the
Barents Sea and the Lofoten area. The closure of these areas wasr Ltd.Open access under CC BY licensea result of political processes where the importance of ecological
factors such as biodiversity and biological production played a
central role. The Lofoten area holds some of the worlds' largest ﬁsh
stocks [1] and bird colonies [2,3].
To ‘open’ an area means that the area is earmarked for potential
oil exploitation and that petroleum companies can apply for
production licenses. Before an area is opened, an impact assess-
ment of the petroleum activities is required, including risks of
pollution [4]. One of the standard elements of such risk assess-
ments is to deﬁne a ‘worst-case scenario’, which is a major
blowout with a speciﬁc duration, rate, oil type, location and
probability, supplemented by an assessment of the associated
environmental impacts. The quality and legitimacy of the pro-
duced worst-case scenarios are at the centre of political debates,
reﬂected in newspaper headlines. In “Misleading picture of risks”
[5] the Ministry of Environment criticises the petroleum sector's
chosen sites for assessing potential blowouts, claiming that these
sites are further away from the shore than the promising petro-
leum ﬁelds. The article “Refuses catastrophe scenario” [6] exposes
a disagreement between petroleum authorities and environmental
and ﬁsheries’ authorities on the relevance of simulating the effect
of a Deepwater Horizon sized oil spill in the Lofoten area, an oil
spill three times the size of the established worst-case scenario..
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shown to be controversial. In the article “Accused of sabotaging
the oil debate” [7], marine scientists are accused of taking a
political position when advising against opening the Lofoten area
to petroleum production, since scientiﬁc evidence suggests that
the potential harm is insigniﬁcant. Also, a marine scientist is
pilloried for stating that the probability of destroying a whole
yearclass of cod larvae in case of a major oil spill lies between
0 and 100% [7]. In addition, the scientists were criticised for
applying safety factors to each component when quantifying
impacts instead of applying this to the ﬁnal outcome, arguing that
the risks become highly exaggerated [7].
Also in the academic literature, different views are expressed
on the production of knowledge related to this policy issue.
Hjermann et al. [8] point to speciﬁc knowledge gaps that need
to be ﬁlled concerning the impact of an oil spill on environmental
and ecological processes. Still, they argue that stochastic processes
make the predictions of long-term effects impossible to achieve.
Knol [9] acknowledges that there is a substantial uncertainty, but
questions the usefulness of ‘ﬁlling knowledge gaps' because it is
unclear how ﬁlling such gaps will support decision-making. She
further argues that natural science has dominated the process on
assessing risks and that the process would have beneﬁtted from
rather being attentive to social issues and concerns [9].
It has long been argued that policy problems characterised by
high stakes, uncertain facts and conﬂicting values, need to place
uncertainty in science at the centre of the debates (see for example
[10–15]). Uncertainty makes different interpretations possible, and
values may be embedded in the knowledge production. The choice
of scope of an investigation, the choice of method and presenta-
tion of results can favour one policy outcome over another.
The aim of this paper is to examine key uncertainties associated
with deﬁning the risk assessment of a worst-case scenario for the
Lofoten area and to discuss how they affect the relevance of such
assessments. It starts by presenting some historical background on
the development of worst-case scenarios for petroleum produc-
tion in Norwegian waters together with management policies to
help us understand the situation on risk assessments today. The
paper then seeks to characterise main uncertainties related to the
worst-case scenario in the Lofoten area concerning: (i) the esti-
mated probability and characteristics of a worst-case scenario and
(ii) the modelled impacts of such an oil spill. In parallel, the paper
shows how uncertainty has allowed different interpretations of
‘facts’ among experts. Uncertainties are further discussed whether
they can be reduced and/or resolved, and whether values are
embedded in the knowledge production. In light of the discussed
uncertainties and the narrow scope of discussed environmental
impacts of a blowout, the paper ﬁnally questions the relevance and
role of risk assessments based on the worst-case scenarios: what
kind of public debate and decision-making are they able to
support?2. Background
2.1. Opening areas in the north
The search for petroleum on the Norwegian continental shelf
started in the 1960s. Exploration was only allowed south of the
621N due to unsettled border issues. Environmental concerns and
consequences for the ﬁsheries were not central political topics
until the 1970s. When the government in 1974 started the
discussion on opening areas in the north, it was recommended
that this would require concern for the environment and existing
enterprise [16]. From that time on, there has been disagreement
on whether to open which areas, based on the different perceptionson whether the implied risks were acceptable or not. In 1988, a
large part of the Barents Sea was opened [17], while areas south of
Lofoten were opened in 1994 [18]. The Lofoten area, Nordland VII
and Troms II (see Fig. 1), remained closed and still are. Nordland VI
(a part of the Lofoten area) was closed again in 2001, when the
preparation for the Management plan for the Barents Sea and the
Lofoten area (from now on referred to as the ‘Management plan’)
was initiated [19].
2.2. The development of risk assessments
A blow-out on the Bravo platform in the North Sea in 1977 put
worst-case scenarios at the forefront of the debate, with a
particular focus on the probability of a blowout. Impact assess-
ments and estimated probability of accidents became mandatory
for the petroleum industry in the Pollution Control Act of 1981
[20]. The act articulates that potential polluters need to undertake
an impact assessment of realistic accidents and estimate the
probability of these. Impact assessments of petroleum activities
in a broader sense were made mandatory through the Petroleum
Act of 1985 [21].
As a consequence of the Alexander Kielland accident in 1980,
the petroleum authorities required that risk assessments had to
include risks with a probability larger than once every 10,000
years [22]. This criterion was abandoned in 1990 [23,24]. Instead,
the industry was given the responsibility to minimise any risk by
addressing potential risks, assessing them and specifying accep-
tance criteria [23].
Models for assessing worst-case scenarios were developed and
used routinely by the industry. Their purpose was to improve oil
well dimensions and oil spill protection systems. The more recent
model versions consider how a set of possible future oil spills may
disperse (by simulating currents, winds, petroleum composition,
volume of spill, etc.), together with their possible environmental
impact (toxicity of oil, overlap with ﬁsh eggs and larvae, seabirds,
type of seashore it could hit) [25].
2.3. Cross-sectoral cooperation leading to shared responsibilities
The Norwegian government decided in 2001 to develop an
integrated ecosystem-based Management plan for the Barents Sea
and the Lofoten area [26]. Environmental impact assessment and
assessments of socioeconomic impacts were developed for all
sectors of human use. The resulting Management plan aims to
balance industry interests with environmental sustainability [19].
It was ratiﬁed in 2006 and updated in 2011, where part of these
processes required public hearings. Three cross-sectoral forums
were appointed to annually update status reports for the Manage-
ment plan: the Management Forum for the Barents Sea–Lofoten
Area, the Advisory Group on Monitoring, and the Forum on
Environmental Risk Management. The members of the latter
include state research institutes and directorates, representing
various disciplines and industry sectors related to the Barents
Sea and Lofoten area. Their mandate has been to work with risk
issues associated with acute pollution in the Management plan
area [27]. For example, as a consequence of the Deepwater
Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the forum was
asked to evaluate the relevance of this blowout to the knowledge
basis for establishing the worst-case scenario for the Lofoten
area [28].
The cross-sectoral forums constitute arenas for discussing claims
and methodological approaches that previously belonged within
the domain of a single sector. For instance risk assessments were
previously the responsibility of the petroleum sector. The develop-
ment of research projects has been another arena for contact
between sectors. The Research Council of Norway has ﬁnanced
Fig. 1. The Lofoten area and adjacent waters. Troms II, Nordland VII and Nordland VI are closed to petroleum production. These areas include coral reefs and are spawning
and nursery areas for several ﬁsh stocks. The marine protected area (MPA) is closed to bottom trawling.
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Some of these projects, and the others ﬁnanced directly by oil
companies, have focused on the reﬁnement of impact assessments
related to worst-case scenarios. Although cross-sector involvement
increases mutual understanding, it has also led to some heated
debates, as the above-cited newspaper headlines suggest. This
paper presents some of these debates.3. Uncertainties and disagreements
This section presents key sources of uncertainty related to
worst-case scenarios, their estimated probabilities and associated
impacts concerning the Lofoten area. It further shows how these
uncertainties allow different interpretations and can result in
disagreements. Both the subsections conclude with a discussion
on whether the uncertainty is reducible and controllable through
quantiﬁcation.3.1. Worst-case scenarios and their probabilities
The updated Management plan presents nine oil spill scenarios
with variations concerning spill size, petroleum composites, type
of events, release sites and environmental impacts [30]. The worst-
case scenario is deﬁned to be 4500 t of oil being released daily for
50 days and for seven different release sites [30]. The expected
frequency of oil spills larger than 100,000 t is estimated for
different production stages and different types of installations,
varying between once every 15,576 and 62,500 years for each well
[30]. Simulations of resulting oil slick distributions are not yet
settled.When establishing worst-case scenarios, the size of realistic
blowouts and oil spills, their probabilities and the petroleum
composite are estimated. The required industry standard expects
blowout risk studies to reﬂect reservoir conditions, operational
procedures, equipment to be used and weather conditions at the
site of concern [31,25].
The estimates of relative frequencies are based on the data
since 1988 from a database of global petroleum activity and
incidents [30,32]. The blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico have not
been considered relevant since the ratio of blowouts to number of
wells has been higher than in the North Sea with statistical
signiﬁcance [28,30]. Due to strict procedure and technical require-
ments in the offshore sector in Norway, only one blowout was
considered sufﬁciently relevant for Nordland VI (see Fig. 1): the
blowout in UK waters in 1989 [33]. The relative frequencies used
for risk analyses for drilling in Nordland VI are established on this
single blowout relative to the number of drilled wells with no
blowouts in the North Sea since 1988 [33]. This baseline estimate
is 5.5 blowouts every 10,000 years [33]. Since there has been a
technical and procedural development since then, resulting in a
reduction of near misses that could have led to blowouts if the
security barriers had failed, the baseline estimate is reduced to
1.5 every 10,000 years [33,28].
The procedure for deciding the baseline estimates for the other
subareas of the Lofoten area have been challenging to ﬁnd. Reports
refer to the same database and software as used for Nordland VI,
but do not include information on the number of blowouts and
non-blowouts. It is reasonable to assume that judgments on what
constitutes comparable conditions have been similar.
Global experience suggests that the probability of a blowout
varies with production stage, choice of technology and geological
conditions, and the relative occurrences between such conditions
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estimate producing relative frequencies for different conditions
and for different blowout releases [28,33–37].
The worst-case scenarios and petroleum composites are estimated
in a similar way and from the same database. Flow rates are
determined from documented blowout ﬂow rates, where physical
and geological conditions are comparable. For example, reservoir
pressure is a key factor [28]. The drift of an oil slick is estimated
using a simulation model taking into account the blowout site,
oceanographic features and oil properties [28].3.1.1. Sources of uncertainty
As stated in the Management plan, historical data are repre-
sentative for the future only to a limited degree [30]. There are
several factors that contribute to uncertainty in assessing the
probability of a blowout: (i) representativeness of empirical data –
workplace conditions, political, geological and environmental
conditions will never be identical to any other situation, (ii) effects
of innovations – the technical developments and improvements of
routines are challenging to account for. Not all are considered
sufﬁciently determined to be included in the calculations [33,34],
(iii) surprises – whether future developments will introduce new
and unexpected events are not possible to know, and (iv) data
scarcity – one blowout limits the conﬁdence in the probability
estimates.
The above uncertainties are also relevant in determining an
appropriate size of a worst-case scenario oil spill, which again
inﬂuences its dispersion. The sites, ocean currents and weather
conditions determine the dispersal of oil slicks, as for example
how much of an oil slick will hit the coastline and whether it will
be dispersed or biodegradated. Production sites at the continental
slope are associated with higher probabilities of a blowout due to
higher pressures, but the resulting oil slick will probably be
transported farther away from the coastline and the critical
distribution areas of ﬁsh. Sources of uncertainties include (i) the
sites – the Lofoten area is not sufﬁciently explored for locating
optimal production sites, (ii) ocean currents – the grid resolution of
the ocean models providing ocean currents and hydrography is
coarse [27], (iii) weather conditions are complex and indetermi-
nate and (iv) the partly unknown petroleum composite, which
inﬂuences an oil slick's fate in the ocean. All these factors
contribute to uncertainty in simulated oil slick dispersal, which
again are used to assess impacts of a worst-case scenario.3.1.2. Discussions and disagreements on factors deﬁning worst-case
scenario
As mentioned above, the Forum on Environmental Risk Man-
agement was requested to evaluate whether the current worst-
case scenario needed to be revised [28]. This generated discussions
across sectors on what constitutes comparable conditions, and on
the effect of necessary expert judgments (due to uncertainties
listed in the above subsection). The principal conclusion in the
report states that the conditions in the Gulf of Mexico are not
representative for the Lofoten case, and therefore, the size of the
worst-case oil spill should remain the same. However, a minority
of the Forum, with members representing the environmental and
ﬁsheries sectors, requested simulations of oil spills with a higher
spill rate and longer duration [28].
Simulations of resulting oil slick distributions have not yet been
made, and there is still disagreement concerning scenario design
and accuracy of models involved (both the oil dispersal and fate
models and ocean models) [38]. Also criteria for selecting informa-
tion for the impact assessments are not yet settled [30].3.1.3. Characteristics of the addressed uncertainties
A reduction of the uncertainty associated with the probability
of a worst-case scenario in the Lofoten area is not likely to be
achievable, as it will require more experience with blowouts and
control of all external factors, and their interactions, that con-
tribute to a blowout. The experts in charge consider the data too
poor for estimating conﬁdence intervals for the release rate and
the duration [28]. With this in mind, the relevance of estimated
probabilities should be questioned. Funtowicz and Ravetz [10] call
science where uncertainty in the input data is suppressed to avoid
indeterminate output as ‘pseudo-science’. This produces mean-
ingless numbers in the sense that it is unknown whether the
number is correct or far off [10]. Substantial uncertainty necessi-
tates assumptions to be made in order to produce quantities. The
assumptions affect the resulting numbers and may beneﬁt a
certain political decision, for example whether a risk is perceived
as acceptable or not [39]. It is noteworthy that experts emphasise
that the difference between blowout frequencies in the Gulf of
Mexico and Norwegian waters is signiﬁcant, while conﬁdence
intervals around blowout related measures are considered unac-
hievable because of uncertainty [28]. The implied uncertainty
stands in stark contrast to the precision in the presented frequency
numbers in the Management plan, where the uncertainty clearly
lies in the ﬁrst digit of for example once per 15,576 years [30].
Some of the other uncertainties listed in the previous section
may be possible to reduce. For example, simulating oil releases
from added sites can enrich our perception of the extent of
polluted areas. However, uncertainty can be reduced only to a
limited extent. Personal judgment and expert opinion will neces-
sarily be a part of such risk assessments because they handle rare
events in complex systems [40].3.2. Impacts of worst-case scenarios
Simulation models for worst-case scenarios have been com-
pared to ﬁsh larvae distributions since 1980 [41]. Only the most
economically important ﬁsh stocks were considered. In the Lofo-
ten area this is Northeast Arctic cod, the world's most abundant
cod stock [7]. The stock migrates from the Barents Sea to the
Lofoten area to spawn [1]. Eggs and larvae drift with the coastal
currents towards the Barents Sea, passing the narrow continental
shelf where the promising petroleum ﬁelds are located [1]. The
second ﬁsh stock of concern is Norwegian Spring Spawning
herring, one of the largest ﬁsh stocks in the world. Herring spawn
along the coast with the main spawning area off Møre, but the
herring larvae must pass the same promising petroleum area on
their way north to their nursery grounds in the Barents Sea [1].
A major oil spill in the Lofoten area during the spawning season
can affect eggs, larvae and the spawning behaviour of mature ﬁsh.
If possible, bigger ﬁsh can escape a polluted area, but eggs and ﬁsh
larvae are far less mobile [8]. With mature cod spawning in a
concentrated area, a major oil spill could more easily overlap the
whole distribution area of the resulting larvae [8] and possibly
affect an entire yearclass of cod.
Simulations of oil dispersal and the probability of various levels
of population loss for several species of marine birds and mam-
mals are presented in the Management plan, while improvements
are requested on the consequences for ﬁsh species [8,28]. The
current improvements include coupling an oil dispersal model and
a distribution model for Northeast Arctic cod eggs and larvae [42].
The simulated diurnal migration of larvae and the reﬁned model-
ling of vertical location of ﬁsh eggs are expected to improve the
estimated exposure of larvae and eggs to toxic oil components
[42]. Also, there are efforts to simulate the effects of egg and larvae
mortality on the future cod stock [43]. These projects are ﬁnanced
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3.2.1. Sources of uncertainty
In spite of expected improvements, uncertainty will remain.
The simulated overlap between oil spill and mature cod, eggs and
larvae is still uncertain. How much will the, partly unknown,
diurnal pattern of larvae, moving up and down the water column,
increase or decrease their chances of getting affected by an oil
slick? How does cod in early life stages follow ocean currents? To
what extent can mature cod avoid an oil slick? Species such as cod,
and especially herring, have variable recruitment success between
years. Typically a few good yearclasses dominate the population,
whereas most years produce only a moderate level of recruitment.
This variability increases the potential harm that a spill in a single
year can inﬂict on the stock [8]. And although spawning ﬁsh may
avoid an oil spill, they may choose less favourable spawning
locations or the spawning ritual may be affected. It is also an open
question whether the majority of the successful recruits come
from only a few portions (limited in space and time) of the
spawned eggs or whether there is a relatively homogenous
contribution from different spawning sites and times [8]. An entire
yearclass could potentially be killed although only a part of the
spawning stock is affected. Further, the abundance of a stock and
its distribution prior to a major oil spill will inﬂuence the impact of
a major oil spill, but the abundance ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly from
one year to another, resulting in uncertain assessments and
predictions, even before taking effects from an oil spill into
account.
There is still uncertainty associated with which concentration
levels of oil are lethal for ﬁsh at various stages. The intensive
research following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, 1989,
identiﬁed eggs and ﬁsh larvae to be the most sensitive life stages
for oil pollution. The lethal dose of oil pollutionwas suggested to be
considerably lower than the previous research indicated [44,45]. In
the US, there has been an ongoing discussion and disagreement
between government scientists and Exxon employed scientists
about the sensitivity of ﬁsh eggs to oil pollution [46]. This issue
has also been a part of the discussion in Norway, and the updated
Management plan settled on a toxicity threshold based on an
average from a review of the academic literature [47]. Several
reports discuss situations where there may be exceptionally high
toxicity. Some substances are more toxic when exposed to light,
making ﬁsh that spawn close to the surface more vulnerable [48].
Some species (for instance herring) may be more exposed to oil
spills because they depend on going to the surface to ﬁll their
swim-bladder and thereby get exposed to oil [49].
Adding to the complexity of the issue, ﬁsh larvae depend on a
continuous availability of prey in order to survive. In case of a
major oil spill, some plankton will die and some plankton will
consume oil, but survive. The survival of larvae will thus hinge on
the recovery time of plankton and/or whether consuming
petroleum-affected plankton will kill larvae. These interactions
will probably only partly be taken into account because of the
complexity of the problem and lack of knowledge and data.
As a ﬁnal remark, an ideal assessment of environmental
impacts would include the effects on every single species in the
area, every stage of their life cycle, cascading effects on ecosystem
components, all possible impacts on the environment, and both
the short- and long-term effects [8]. This means that there is
considerable uncertainty related to impact assessments.
3.2.2. Discussions and disagreements on impacts of a worst-case
scenario
There have been mainly two discussions concerning impact
assessments: the lack of details in impact assessments and thepresentation of assessment results. The recent and the ongoing
projects on impact assessments can be understood as critique of the
simplistic versions developed on contract from the petroleum
sector. Considerable effort has been put into reﬁnements of these
assessments.
The starting point of impact assessments is a range of spill sizes
(varying duration and rate) from numerous locations (both geo-
graphically and at different depths in the water column), and the
assessments include cod and herring. The produced results are
numerous, and there is an ongoing discussion on whether to focus
the results on (1) the expected outcome, predicting the average
adverse effects of an oil spill on ﬁsh stocks, or (2) the worst-case
effects of the worst-case scenario, showing the likelihood of
serious adverse effects, as for example, the loss of more than
50% of a yearclass. The spill scenarios developed for the revision of
the Management plan [27] predicted that on average even the
worst-case scenario would have little adverse effects, but that
there was a certain probability it could affect a large proportion of
the yearclass of cod and especially herring. These effects would be
further magniﬁed if that occurred during a year with high
recruitment, further diverging the worst possible outcome from
the expected one.3.2.3. Characteristics of the addressed uncertainties
The experience from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Gulf
of Alaska shows that long term effects are not only difﬁcult to
predict, but also challenging to determine even with the beneﬁt of
hindsight [50]. Before this oil spill, it was assumed that acute
mortality was the key concern, but experience from this oil spill
indicates an unexpected long-term effect on wildlife [51]. On the
other hand, uncertainty still remains on whether the oil spill was
the major cause of the herring stock collapses [49].
Present efforts of reﬁning risk assessments have the potential
to reduce some of the associated uncertainties. For example,
including cod larvae's diurnal migration pattern may offer new
insight in potential overlaps between an oil slick and cod larvae.
However, including more detailed information will introduce new
layers of uncertainty: Is the model resolution sufﬁciently ﬁne to
assess the exposure of larvae during their migration up and down
the water column? What other factors determine survival of larvae
to later life stages?
There are several sources of uncertainty that make the asso-
ciated uncertainty challenging to reduce: (i) Major oil spills are
rare, and hence empirical knowledge is scarce. The conditions
have rarely been the same from one blowout to another, and oil
tanker accidents and recent blowouts reveal unpredicted dispersal
or phenomena that have not been observed before, for example
the fate of an oil slick [52,53]. (ii) Ocean currents and other
environmental conditions are inﬂuenced by stochastic processes
and will affect the distribution of an oil slick, on ﬁsh stocks and
other marine life in a non-predictive way [8]. (iii) Political, cultural,
natural and technical conditions change and will always be
unpredictable to some extent. Taken together, uncertainty will
necessarily remain, both on the probability and the size of a worst-
case scenario. The uncertainty is thus reducible only to some
indeterminate extent.
Concerning the presentation of risks, there is a structural issue on
how the “worst case” is deﬁned. The “worst case” could be related
only to the size of the oil spill, but it could also be deﬁned as the
worst case in terms of fate, weather conditions, time of year, overlap
with ﬁsh larvae, etc. As a result, the risk assessment for an equally
large oil spill is driven by the choice of how that “worst case” is
deﬁned. A second issue relates to the low probability, high impact
and nature of the risk. Presenting only the worst outcome would
overemphasise the potential danger, whereas presenting averages
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away from the rare, severe, accidents. Finally the temporal and
spatial scales are a matter of choice, for example weighing the local
environment against the risks to the large ﬁsh stocks. The above
aspects illustrate that impact assessments are based on a range of
choices that can generate quite different answers.4. Discussion on uncertainty
The previous section pointed to a number of uncertainties
related to risk assessments, and the paper has shown that
uncertainties have given rise to disagreements between experts.
This section will now discuss the addressed uncertainties in terms
of their possible consequences: will the uncertainty issues be
resolved? And given the narrow scope of the risk assessments, for
what purposes are they relevant? The section then discusses the
various roles of risk assessments and the associated uncertainties.
4.1. Controlling uncertainty
A relevant concern is whether the above described uncertainty
can be described through quantitative measures. To some degree it
can: quantitative uncertainty measures can be provided in cases
where uncertainty is due to the lack of measurement precision and
to some extent variability. But uncertainty cannot fully be quanti-
ﬁed when facing ignorance – what we do not know, and even
further: what is beyond our conception of what is possible [10].
There are aspects of future natural, political, cultural, and technical
conditions that cannot be anticipated, and that most likely would
affect not only the numerical value of the estimated worst-case
scenario, but also our understanding of it, if there were more
knowledge. Likewise, there are ecosystem processes that are not
understood, and it is unknown how or whether these affect larvae
and the future ﬁsh stocks. This implies that risk assessments are
associated with uncertainty that cannot be quantiﬁed adequately.
The problem is that it is not possible to know whether this
uncertainty is negligible or whether it decreases the relevance of
the risk assessments for decision making.
Yet, the implied ignorance just described might be negligible
compared to the uncertainty resulting from the narrow scope of
risk assessments or from disregarding other possible risks than
major oil spills. First, the public debates and the debates between
experts have concentrated on the probability of a major oil spill,
which reﬂects just an interval of a continuous event space of oil
spill sizes, where a possible oil spill could be smaller and still have
a signiﬁcant impact on the environment. Second, the scope of
impacts of a major oil spill is concentrated on effects on cod and
herring larvae, while impacts on other species are not considered.
Third, most long-term effects and cascading effects on ecosystem
components are not addressed. And fourth, whether a major oil
spill can have an irreversible effect on a ﬁsh stock or an ecosystem
is not a part of the public or expert debate. A consequence of the
choice of scope and models is that possible impacts are reduced to
a temporary impact because the choice of scientiﬁc approach
includes an assumption that the cod stock will, given time, recover
from an oil spill. But experience, for example on the overﬁshing of
Northern cod [54] or the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill [51],
suggests that major impacts can cause changes in the ecosystem
structure which make it difﬁcult, maybe impossible, for stocks or
ecosystems to recover.
Weinberg [55, p. 209] introduced the concept of ‘trans-science’,
deﬁned as “questions that can be asked of science and yet which
cannot be answered by science”. Risk assessment is in the realm of
trans-science: ﬁrst, a sound empiric basis for calculating a worst-
case scenario and its probability would have required decades, atleast, to provide a sufﬁcient number of comparable blowouts and
second, due to the complexity of ecosystems, a complete assess-
ment of impacts is not achievable. This means that choices, of
which some will not be science based, need to be made on how to
approach the problem of whether petroleum production in the
Lofoten area constitutes an acceptable risk to the environment,
and if so, in which localities and with what safeguards.
4.2. Relevance of risk assessments
A pressing question is whether the present choice of approach,
resulting in a quite narrow scope of risk assessments, is relevant
for policy making. As argued above, quantiﬁed measures for risk
assessments and its associated uncertainties are impossible to
achieve without, perhaps considerable, uncertainty. Still, risk
assessments may indicate important perspectives on risks. It is
reasonable to assume that in case the area is opened, simulation
studies may indicate sites that are likely to cause less harm than
others in case of a major oil spill. The oil industry has proven to
hold technological equipment and knowhow to drill horizontally
for quite some distance and has used this technology to avoid
drilling close to vulnerable benthic communities such as coral
reefs [56]. A different aspect of developing risk assessments is that
the cooperation between sectors on developing criteria for these
has already facilitated new discussions and reﬂections on knowl-
edge and uncertainty.
Taken together, the development of risk assessments based on
the worst-case scenarios has a certain potential. However, it is
disputable whether worst-case scenarios can be used as a key
instrument for deciding whether to open the Lofoten area or not.
How well do effects on cod larvae represent the effects on the
ecosystem? And how can the attention these risk assessments get
from the experts and the public be understood?
4.3. Risk assessments and their framing
There is a need to look closer at the role of risk assessments and
their uncertainties. First of all it must be clear what it is. A worst-
case scenario is not a worst imaginable scenario. It is not a
combination of events, for example a major blowout together
with some other kind of accident in the area, amplifying unfortu-
nate impacts. It is not an imagined terror attack on installations,
and the impact of a blowout is not combined with other human
stressors (overﬁshing, aqua-culture, discharges from other indus-
tries and ocean trafﬁc). As deﬁned, a worst-case scenario is a
scenario based on the so-called “realistic” major oil spills caused by
a blowout. Because its scope of impacts is narrow and other risks are
not included, it is a rather incomplete risk assessment.
To understand the roles of worst-case scenarios and risk
assessments, two perspectives need to be examined. From a
petroleum company's point of view, a risk assessment is a tool
for internal management. The company has to fulﬁl certain criteria
according to the regulations and laws in order to get permission
for petroleum production. Also, risk assessments are needed to
take action and for cost-beneﬁt considerations, as blowouts are
very expensive for an oil company. From a political point of view,
risk assessments serve as a tool to decide whether the risk is
acceptable to society, and the public's concerns on possible
impacts may be very different from a petroleum company's
concern. These two different, and to some extent conﬂicting, uses
of risk assessments raise questions about the design and owner-
ship of the risk assessment process. Risk assessments may serve
their purpose for internal management and may not be contro-
versial within the sector. Now these risk assessments are brought
into cross-sectoral forums and are in addition being applied for an
area associated with rich fauna, great ﬁsheries values and strong
K.H. Hauge et al. / Marine Policy 44 (2014) 82–8988identity sentiments. For the ﬁsheries and environmental sector,
worst-case scenarios have deﬁned an arena to highlight the
importance of environmental values, quality knowledge and the
need for research [9]. Thereby, risk assessments and the associated
uncertainties provide opportunities to postpone decisions. Taken
together, risk assessments and worst-case scenarios serve as a
common device for discussion and negotiation while their mean-
ing and function varies.
This paper has pointed to the limited scope of risk assessments
and has questioned their relevance. Yet, discussions on their
quality centre less on their scope and more on their details,
accepting the narrow framing of the problem. Criticisms include
the criteria for deﬁning the worst-case scenario, the choice which
ecosystem impacts to examine, the lack of realism in quantifying
larvae mortality and its resulting effect on the future ﬁsh stocks,
and the communication of results to policy makers and the public.
These demand reﬁnements of the existing approach, and a range
of efforts, including research projects, are attempting to meet
these demands. This implies that the criticism centres on the
quality of the existing risk assessment based on the worst-case
scenarios, rather than discussing whether these are informative or
can be used for deciding whether the environmental risks are
acceptable.
The following may partly explain this situation. Risk assess-
ments were initially developed by the petroleum sector and were
used by the same sector to make decisions. Through the process
linked to the Management plan, other sectors were invited into a
settled culture for assessing risk. However, it should be pointed
out that the way knowledge gaps are addressed in the preparatory
report for the ﬁrst Management plan [19] matches the approach to
reﬁne the impact assessments. The report gives the impression
that the listed knowledge gaps are possible to ﬁll, that at least
some should be ﬁlled and that ﬁlling knowledge gaps will increase
the quality of advice to decision making [9]. The recent and
present efforts to reﬁne impact assessments correspond to several
of the listed knowledge gaps. The particular framing of the risk
assessment decides which uncertainties are relevant to discuss
and which are not. In this case, reﬁnements of worst-case
scenarios and risk assessments are legitimate while questioning
the narrow scope is less so. A worst-case scenario can therefore be
understood as a certain way of packaging uncertainty in the policy
debate. A consequence of this framing is that representatives from
the petroleum sector emphasise the low probability (e.g. in [57]),
while environmental NGOs emphasise the great impacts of a
major oil spill (e.g. in [58]).
4.4. Uncertainty and values
The discussions on uncertainties in this paper suggest that
value-laden choices are made (consciously or unconsciously) at
three stages: when deciding the scope of risk assessments, when
methodological choices are made, and when deciding how results
should be presented. It is possible that the policy debate would
have been different if other environmental impacts had been
emphasised (smaller oil spills, irreducible changes, etc.), if quali-
tative approaches were more central or if the presentation of risks
had been different. Such choices may favour one political action
over another. The same issues arise with various handlings of
uncertainty. All these choices are value-laden because they have
the potential to inﬂuence perceptions on what is at risk, how high
the risk is, and what ought to be done with regard to the issue.
The substantial uncertainties addressed in this paper suggest
that the ﬁnal decision is more a value question than a scientiﬁc
question. In this case a ranking of risks could be performed to
ensure a wider scope on the issue. Risk issues include smaller
sized oil releases, loss of work places, population decline in theLofoten area, decline of economic wealth and standard of living in
Norway, the loss of industry know-how, pollution from everyday
operations, Norwegian identities at stake, collapsed ecosystem, the
petroleum industry's contribution to the acidiﬁcation of the
oceans, political goals on reducing CO2 emissions, the national
economic dominance of the petroleum industry and how this
affects the conditions for other industries in Norway in times of
global economic crises, future instability of petroleum income
shares in a global market and others. These risk issues may be just
as relevant to look into as risks addressed by worst-case scenarios.
In light of the addressed uncertainties, limitations and value-
ladenness, to what extent is there a role for experts and science?
Knowledge about technical and environmental conditions is
clearly essential for decision making. However, since values are
often embedded in methodological choices, uncertainty needs to
be carefully addressed [10]. This paper seeks to contribute to an
increased awareness around crucial uncertainties and their roles.
Because of value-ladenness and uncertainty, extended peer-review
is central in post-normal science [11]. Our ﬁndings suggest that
the policy process and the role of experts and science should be
discussed and revised in relation to open the Lofoten area to
petroleum production. However, further discussions on this topic
lie outside the scope of this paper.Acknowledgements
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